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Abstract
Eugène Minkowski was a French psychiatrist and philosopher during the first half 
of the twentieth century. He integrated the phenomenology of Husserl as well as 
French philosophy into the domain of psychopathology. However, previous studies of 
Minkowski have not focused on his interpretation of phenomenology, partly because of 
the difficulty of his interdisciplinary approach. In order to clarify certain aspects of his 
works on phenomenology, here, we will focus on the theme of spaces as proposed in his 
works. We believe our study of such spaces will show that Minkowski's philosophical 
contemplation between phenomenology and psychopathology would anticipate the 
work of Merleau-Ponty.
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要旨
ウジェーヌ・ミンコフスキーは20世紀前半にフランスで活躍した精神医学者で
あり哲学者である。哲学の分野においては、フッサール現象学とフランス思想
を精神病理学の分野に初めて導入した人物として知られている。しかしながら、
その功績にも関わらず、ミンコフスキーについてはこれまで、その分野横断的
な思想の困難さから、彼が現象学をどのように解釈し、これを精神病理学の分
野に導入したかについて詳細に研究されたことはなかった。したがって本論文
においては、彼の現象学を明らかにするために、彼の空間論に焦点を当てる。
これによって彼の現象学と精神医学を結ぶ仕事の核心が、メルロ＝ポンティに
よって受け継がれたことが明らかになるだろう。
キーワード：明るい空間、　暗い空間、　精神障害、　分節化、　名残、　人間的
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Introduction
Eugène Minkowski was a French psychiatrist and philosopher during the ﬁrst half of 
the twentieth century. He studied and trained in psychiatry in Germany, but after the First 
World War he worked, for the most part, in France. He integrated the phenomenology 
of Husserl as well as French philosophy into the domain of psychopathology. 
However, previous studies of Minkowski have not focused on his interpretation of 
phenomenology partly because of the difficulty of his interdisciplinary approach. To 
examine an aspect of his work on phenomenology, we will focus here on the theme of 
spaces according to Minkowski.
1. The light space
The light space is a visual space (Minkowski 1970: 372) endowed with light. In 
addition, it is a socialized domain (Minkowski 1970: 393). As a result the light space 
constitutes a social domain for each person. As Minkowski wrote:
I also situate myself in this space, and in doing so I make myself similar 
to ambient things, at least in one aspect of my being; I occupy a place in 
this space in relation to other objects which are there, exactly as they do. 
(Minkowski 1970: 428)
Once ‘I’ is placed in the light space, ‘I’ becomes something that resembles other 
objects, occupying a place. Therefore, ‘I’ has a spread, a distance and an extent. In 
this way, we can say that the light space as public domain has two functions. First, it 
establishes ‘I’ as a thickness that constitutes a part of this space. Whether I want to or 
not, I occupy a place once I live in this world. Second, the light space makes visible the 
condition in which ‘I’ is installed, drawing a comparison with other objects. It permits ‘I’ 
to reﬂect on this situation with visibility. Minkowski underlines this point as follows:
I “fall into lines” in this way, so to speak, and the space that englobes 
all of us brings about a leveling effect. Space thus becomes a “public 
domain”. I share it with everything that is there (…), I occupy only 
a very small place in it. It is in this space that I see my fellow men - 
seeing, moving, acting, living as I do. (Minkowski 1970: 428)
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In the light space, ‘I’ becomes ‘we’. ‘I’ am embedded in ‘we’ and the light space makes 
‘me’ as small as my fellow men. Observing their comportment, I am conscious of my 
condition. For Minkowski, however, this situation is not Hell (Sartre 1947). Actually, 
‘I’ can share this space as a social domain with others, and this space is a priori related 
to the world. But the light space has a more important feature. Minkowski ﬁnds a cause 
of mental disease in the transformation of the relation between the light space and the 
dark space. The light space is not the cause of the disease, but it is the place where it 
manifests because the light space is the common world. 
2. The dark space
The light space is the space of vision, while the second space, the dark space, is that of 
touch. As Minkowski describes it:
Precisely because of this it [obscurity] does not spread out before me 
but touches me directly, envelops me, embraces me, even penetrates me, 
completely, passes through me, so that one could almost say that while 
the ego is permeable by darkness it is not permeable by light. The ego 
does not afﬁrm itself in relation to darkness but becomes confused with it. 
 (Minkowski 1970: 429)
In the dark space, no matter how I have established myself, as I occupy a part of the 
world, I do not have consciousness of my actions. Because I penetrate the dark space, I 
receive and mingle with it. Moreover, Minkowski states:
A light, a spark, can surge up in obscurity like a shooting star, only to 
disappear again. A murmur, a sound, a voice can be uttered; an icy blast 
can pass by. Obscurity can even be ﬁlled, be peopled, so to speak, with 
murmurs and noises. (Minkowski 1970: 429)
As we have seen, Minkowski shows the light space as the space of vision. The other, 
the dark space, is the space of touch. Here, however, the dark space is described as that 
of hearing (a murmur, a sound, a voice) as well as vision (a light, a spark, a shooting 
star). Therefore, for Minkowski, the dark space is full of the ﬁve senses, while the light 
space is that of vision as reﬂection only.
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There is a paradox here. Minkowski claims that I cannot raise myself in the dark space 
and am confused by it. However, how can this self bring back these experiences of 
the dark space with this luxuriance of senses if it does not have consciousness of its 
manifestations in the dark space? It has just been afﬁrmed that the dark space is ﬁlled 
with the senses, but here, Minkowski writes:
Dark space completely envelops me and penetrates me far more than 
light space; the distinction between inside and outside and, as a consequence, 
the distinction between the sense organs also, in so far as they are 
destined for exterior perception, play only a completely unimportant 
role here. (Minkowski 1970: 432)
It has already been stated that a light, a murmur, and an icy blast can appear in the dark 
space. Here, in contrast, Minkowski nearly abandons the role of the sense organs in this 
space. Without these, how can there be experience and creation of a vivid description 
of the dark space?
To attempt to answer this question, we will now study the relation between the light 
space and the dark space.
3. The overlap between the light space and the dark space
Minkowski (1970: 431) believes that, in normal life, the light space and the dark space 
“are in complete accord” but there is a disturbance in the relations of the two spaces. 
He comments as follows:
In order to characterize the relations between these two ways of living 
space as adequately as possible, one would have to ask whether light 
space is surrounded by dark space or whether it is ingrained in it. 
(Minkowski 1970: 432)
In this way, Minkowski reﬂects on the relation between the light space and the dark space; 
he states that the latter surrounds the former like the frame of a picture. One can live 
in these two spaces in two different ways, but one cannot remain conscious of the dark 
space. This raises the question: How can one know something that stays in the shadow 
of the consciousness? To attempt to answer this question, we will take the example of a 
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perturbation of relations between two spaces. Minkowski quotes F. Fischer (1929 & 1930): 
“I only know now,” the patient said, “that the autumn countryside” 
(which was before him) “without changing place is penetrated by 
another space, so fine and invisible that you can scarcely observe it. 
This second space is obscure or empty or terrifying; it is difﬁcult to say 
which of these expressions comes closest to the truth. Sometimes one 
space seems to move; sometimes they pass through each other. They 
intersect single space. For the same thing happens in me. There is a 
continual interrogation directed at me, it orders me to lie down, to die, 
even, or to continue to go ahead”. (Minkowski 1970: 432-433)
This patient declares that there is a penetration of one space into the other. The autumn 
countryside is ordinary, but something strange penetrates it. It is difficult for him to 
notice this phenomenon, so he reports this experience of the overlap of two spaces with 
some difﬁculty. From the patient’s phrase, Minkowski concludes that “two dissociated 
worlds, one superimposed upon the other, exist in him” (1970: 423). While in ordinary 
life the light space is edged and supported by the dark space, in the diseased life the 
two spaces overlap.
We can interpret Minkowski’s reﬂections on the relation between the two spaces in this 
way, but what demonstrates these relations? We would like to recall one question that 
arose at the end of section 2; how can one have consciousness of and describe the dark 
space? Let us draw a conclusion about this question from the reﬂections of Minkowski; 
experience of the dark space can be described by borrowing from patients who feel 
something painful and have consciousness of the dark space. In addition, these patients 
use the sensations and consciousness of the light space. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “[t]he 
murky space which invades the schizophrenic’s world cannot substantiate its claim to 
be a space without being related to clear space” (2002: 336). The dark space cannot be 
justiﬁed by itself, but it can assert itself as a certain space owing to the lightness of the 
light space. Merleau-Ponty goes on to say:
He always retains, with clear space, the means of exorcising these specters 
and returning to the everyday world. The phantoms are fragments drawn 
from the clear world and borrow from it such standing as they are capable  
of enjoying. (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 336)
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As all is formed by the overlap of the two spaces, phantoms have two aspects, too. 
Although phantoms lead to disease and shadows, Merleau-Ponty considers them proof 
that patients do keep the way open to the common world. In this way, persons with 
diseases are tied to the common world owing to its light and order.
4. The light and psychopathological comprehension
Minkowski discerned an overlap between the dark space and the light space and 
Merleau-Ponty respected this relation between the two spaces. Therefore, Merleau-Ponty 
noticed debris of the light space in the dark space. For Minkowski and Merleau-Ponty, 
the dark space is as essential as the light space. As we have already noted, the dark 
space is deep, fertile, and full of mystery. Here, however, we show that the light space 
has an important role in the ﬁelds of phenomenology and psychopathology. 
Why does Merleau-Ponty declare that there is debris of the light space in the dark 
space? He writes:
Are not mere appearance and opinion being brought back under the 
name of phenomenon? Is not the origin of precise knowledge being 
identiﬁed with a decision as unwarrantable as the one which shuts up 
the madman in his madness, and is not the last word of this wisdom to 
lead us back to the anguish of idle and solitary subjectivity? These are 
doubts which need to be dispelled. Mythical or dream-like consciousness, 
insanity and perception are not, in so far as they are different, hermetically 
sealed within themselves; they are not small islands of experience cut 
off from each other, and from which there is no escape. 
 (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 340)
Here, Merleau-Ponty clearly illustrates the possibility for the light consciousness 
to communicate with the mythical or fantastic consciousness, in other words, 
the consciousness of the dark space. Subjectivity in the field of phenomenology 
does not enclose the lunatic in madness, even when hallucinating; rather it always 
maintains a way to return to the common world through the light space. This way to 
the common world is the same as that which Jaspers (1971) called “the possibility 
of comprehension” in his psychopathology. That is to say, Merleau-Ponty excluded 
the anxiety of subjectivity, equating the way in phenomenology with that which 
psychopathology has opened.
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How are these two ﬁelds equated? As Merleau-Ponty says:
But mythical consciousness does indeed open on to a horizon of 
possible objectiﬁcations. Primitive man lives his myths against a 
sufficiently articulate perceptual background for the activities of daily 
life, ﬁshing, hunting and dealings with civilized people, to be possible. 
The myth itself, however diffuse, has an identiﬁable signiﬁcance for 
primitive man, simply because it does form a world, that is, a whole in 
which each element has meaningful relations with the rest. 
(Merleau-Ponty 2002: 341)
The mythical consciousness, namely the consciousness of the dark space, always 
maintains both the lightness and the darkness. Merleau-Ponty (2002: 341) called this 
relation between the lightness and the darkness “the link between subjectivity and 
objectivity”. This band makes psychopathological comprehension possible. Myths, 
madness, dreams are articulated and they have identiﬁable senses because they form 
the world, namely a totality, though they are unconscious. Merleau-Ponty continues:
It is true that mythical consciousness is not a consciousness of anything. 
That is to say that subjectively it is a ﬂux, that it does not become static 
and thus does not know itself. Objectively, it does not posit before itself 
terms deﬁnable as a certain number of properties, which can be isolated 
from one another and which are in fact interlinked. But it is not borne 
away by each of its pulsations, otherwise it would not be conscious 
of anything at all. It does not stand back from its noemata, but on the 
other hand, if it passed away with each one of them, and if it did not 
tentatively suggest objectiﬁcation, it would not crystallize itself in 
myths. (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 341)
He distinguishes the mythical consciousness, the consciousness of the dark space, from 
the consciousness of the thing. On the side of subjectivity, the consciousness of the 
dark space does not know anything. On the other hand, on the side of objectivity, the 
consciousness poses nothing before the consciousness itself. Thus, the consciousness 
stays in the shadow of the two sides. However, the consciousness always keeps identiﬁable 
senses, being connected with the consciousness of the light space. The movement of 
objectiﬁcation and the movement and the light always exist in the dark space; therefore, 
the dark consciousness can be crystallized.
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5. Conclusion
We have followed studies on two spaces by Minkowski and Merleau-Ponty. For both 
phenomenology and psychopathology it is important to discover the debris of the light 
space in the dark space, because the light opens the way to the common world and the 
senses. One cannot be completely isolated from the world and other people, although 
one may want to be; one must always live in this totality. In other words, the world can 
never be reduced to separate elements.
Here, in conclusion, we would like to observe two different understandings of the light 
space from Merleau-Ponty and attach these to the cosmology of Minkowski. In The 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty (2002) distinguishes two spaces: the 
geometric space and the lived space. This distinction corresponds to the light space 
and the dark space. These two spaces are different but are equally human. Further, 
Merleau-Ponty discusses a third space, the non-human space which is the natural space. 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the light space is the human space, but it is also non-human. 
Merleau-Ponty writes the following:
The dream space is segregated from the space of clear thinking, but 
it uses all the latter’s articulations; the world obsesses us even during 
sleep, and it is about the world that we dream.
 (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 341) 
The light space can be articulated as the space of the dream: the dark space. For 
Merleau-Ponty, the function of articulation rises from objectivity. He continues:
This link between subjectivity and objectivity, which already exists in 
mythical or childlike consciousness, and which still survives in sleep or 
insanity, is to be found, a fortiori, in normal experience. I never wholly 
live in varieties of human space, but am always ultimately rooted in a 
natural and non-human space. (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 342) 
Subjectivity and objectivity are connected in the dark space and the light space. 
Moreover, this band always exists in our consciousness when we have dreams. In other 
words, we take root in the natural and non-human space, in the light space.
- 103 -
The Two Spaces of Eugène Minkowski
In this way, Merleau-Ponty gives two different understandings of the light space. First, 
it is an anthropological space. Second, it is a non-human and natural space. We can read 
these two understandings of the light space in Towards a Cosmology (Minkowski 1999). 
Here, Minkowski takes on the challenge of enlarging the meaning of the word ‘human’ 
until it does not mean ‘proper to humans’. In his cosmology, the human is uniﬁed with 
the universe, and the human and the non-human are affirmed simultaneously. In order 
to clarify this new anthropology which includes nature and the universe, we will need to 
continue our research on the works of Minkowski and Merleau-Ponty. 
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